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CONSENT REQUIREMENTS IN COMPULSORY FIELDWIDE
UNITIZATION
Introduction: The Context of the Consent Requirement
The Rule of Capture has played an important role in the development
of American oil and gas law. The rule states that a landowner acquires
title to all the oil and gas he can produce from operations on his land,
even though part of that oil and gas may have migrated from adjoining
lands. This allows a landowner to drain oil and gas from beneath his
neighbor's land without liability.' The rule therefore provides economic
incentive for each landowner to drill and produce as rapidly as possible
in order to maximize his portion of the available minerals.
2
Despite the role that the Rule of Capture has played in the historical
development of oil and gas law, modern economic conditions have
resulted in reevaluation of the rule. An early justification for the rule
was that it provided a needed incentive for exploration and production
of oil and gas. Today such incentive is provided by worldwide demand
for oil and gas. Additionally, the rule is now seen as having several
undesirable effects. It causes economic waste by encouraging the drilling
of more wells than are necessary to efficiently and economically drain
mineral reservoirs. It causes physical waste of oil and gas by encouraging
rapid production. Rapid production may also cause dissipation of a
reservoir's natural drive mechanisms which will limit ultimate recovery
from the reservoir.3 Recognition of these undesirable effects of the Rule
of Capture has led to the development of several restrictions on its
application. These restrictions include well spacing rules, the use of
allowables as limits on production and establishment of pooled units.
One relatively recent restriction on the Rule of Capture has been the
development of compulsory fieldwide unitization.
4
Fieldwide unitization is intended to temper the effects of the Rule
of Capture by preventing the drilling of unnecessary wells, increasing
Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
I. Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558 (1948); 1 H. Williams
& C. Meyers, Oil and Gas Law §§ 204.4 - 204.9 (1984) (also discussing exception for
negligent or wasteful loss of recoverable hydrocarbons or negligent injury to the producing
formation).
2. 1 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note I, § 204.4.
3. See id. at §§ 204.4 - 204.7.
4. R. Meyers, Pooling and Unitization § 1.03 (2d ed. 1967).
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ultimate recovery of oil and gas, and protecting correlative rights of
the mineral estate owners.' This conservation is effected by the com-
bination or pooling of two or more separate tracts of land having
different ownership in order to operate an entire reservoir as though
all the tracts were of common ownership. 6 This unitization creates a
joint interest in developing the unit as efficiently and economically as
possible for maximum recovery.7
One use of fieldwide unitization is to facilitate enhanced recovery
operations.8 Secondary recovery includes utilizing energy sources extrinsic
to the reservoir to increase production, such as by water or gas injection. 9
Tertiary recovery generally involves enhancing the characteristics of the
reservoir by the injection of heat or chemicals which improve the mi-
gration of oil and gas.' 0 In order for such injection operations to operate
successfully, it is necessary to force the oil and gas towards wells where
it can be efficiently produced. This generally requires the crossing of
lease lines, and unitization is needed to facilitate this joint cooperation
between leaseholds.1"
There are many benefits to fieldwide unitization and secondary
recovery operations. All parties benefit from enhanced total recovery.
Extraction by primary production techniques generally recovers between
ten and thirty percent of the total oil and gas in place. 2 In contrast,
secondary recovery methods will usually increase primary recovery by
thirty to sixty percent and sometimes by over one-hundred percent. 3
The royalty owner benefits by being able to agree in advance contrac-
5. Id. at § 8.01; Technically, the terms "pooling" and "unitization" should be
distinguished. "Pooling" is generally defined as the "bringing together of small tracts
sufficient for the granting of a well permit under applicable spacing rules." "Unitization"
is "the joint operation of all or some part of a producing reservoir." 6 H. Williams &
C. Meyers, supra note I, §§ 901, 913.1.
6. Barfield, Field Wide Units, Landman, May, 1983, at 41.
7. Id.
8. Clark, Forming The Fieldwide Unit, 1970 Nat'l Inst. For Petroleum Landmen
I1, 112.
9. Id.; R. Meyers, supra note 4, §§ 2.02 -2.03.
10. Fant, Legal Issues in Implementing Secondary and Tertiary Recovery Operations
on Federal Oil and Gas Leases, 19 Land & Water L. Rev. 1 (1984).
I1. Barfield, supra note 6, at 41; Dutton, A Summary of Unitization In Various
States, Landman, June, 1985, at 43.
12. Comment, Secondary Recovery of Oil & Gas-The Rule of Positive Dominion,
9 Land & Water L. Rev. 457, 459 (1974); Rogers & Gault, Mississippi Compulsory Field-
Wide Unitization, 44 Miss. L.J. 185, 195-96 (1973); Prutzman, Cage, Fletcher, Keith,
Miller & Winn, Chronicle of Creating a Fieldwide Unit, A Case History of an Actual
Field Unitization, 1963 Nat'l Inst. for Petroleum Landmen, 77, 93-94; W. Lovejoy and
P. Homan, Economic Aspects of Oil Conservation Regulation 196 (1967) (questioning the
accuracy of such calculations).
13. Comment, supra note 12, at 459; Rogers & Gault, supra note 12, at 195-96.
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tually as to what constitutes his fair share of production, and that share
generally cannot be altered by unit changes or the Rule of Capture.'
Additionally, the royalty owner's income is stabilized, prolonged, and
protected by participation in all wells rather than reliance upon one
well.' 5 This stabilization of production has had the further benefit to
all parties of making a well a bankable asset and commodity.' 6 The
unit operator and lessees benefit from lower operating costs resulting
from the operation of the whole field by one party, the freedom to
locate and produce wells selectively, and reduced surface acreage re-
quirements.'7 Federal and state governments benefit from increased tax
revenues and increased royalty from government lands. Society is the
ultimate beneficiary of this conservation and increased economic effi-
ciency. I8
Although fieldwide unitization offers many apparent benefits, this
method of production has been criticized on several grounds. One in-
teresting criticism is aimed at one of fieldwide unitization's underlying
goals of preventing physical waste. This criticism states that this goal,
as achieved by the slower production resulting from fieldwide unitization,
ignores the possibility that the increased recovery of oil and gas at some
future date may not be worth, to producers or to society, the required
sacrifice of current consumption.' 9 Another criticism is aimed at the
apparent disregard for an individual owner's interests in favor of a
societal policy of conservation. For example, an individual may have
interests such as tax considerations for not desiring long-run benefits as
opposed to immediate monetary gain from the oil and gas under his
land, but such interests are overridden in favor of conservation. As
such, fieldwide unitization has been criticized as socialistic.2" Criticisms
are also aimed at problems involved in administration by major operators
and apportionment under the control of government officials. 2'
Despite these and other criticisms, several states have enacted com-
pulsory fieldwide unitization statutes. The need for statutory authori-
zation to compel fieldwide unitization was recognized after several cases
held that neither courts nor administrative agencies had the authority
to compel such conservation without legislative directive. One such case
14. McAnelly, A Review of Poolwide Unitization Under Act 441 of 1960, 15 Inst.
on Min. L. 3, 16 (1968).
15. Barfield, supra note 6, at 41.
16. R. Meyers, supra note 4, § 1.01(3).
17. McAnelly, supra note 14, at 7, 16; Barfield, supra note 6, at 41.
18. See generally, W. Lovejoy & P. Homan, supra note 12.
19. McDonald, Unit Operation of Oil Reservoirs as an Instrument of Conservation,
49 Notre Dame Law. 305, 308 (1973).
20. Comment, supra note 12, at 472.
21. Id.
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is Western Gulf Oil Co. v. Superior Oil Co. 22 In this case the plaintiffs
had attempted to unitize the Paloma Oil Field in order to enhance
ultimate recovery. The plaintiffs were operating gas cycling operations
over part of the reservoir, but their efforts were being frustrated by
the defendant's reliance upon the Rule of Capture. The defendants were
producing as rapidly as possible and refusing to reinject gas, which
reduced reservoir pressure, caused retrograde condensation, and drained
oil and gas from the plaintiff's operations. The court held that a
determination of whether public policy required compulsory fieldwide
unitization was a question for the legislature and thus denied plaintiff's
request for relief.23
The resulting statutes authorized the "compulsion" of fieldwide
unitization. Voluntary fieldwide unitization occurs when all lessees agree
to operate the reservoir jointly as a unit. In theory voluntary unitization
would be easily obtained as all parties would understand the benefits
to be derived from such operations. But in practice there are many
barriers to voluntary fieldwide unitization. 24 A minority of one or more
persons can prevent the entire voluntary operation by refusing to consent
thereto. This power to block a repressure program by refusing to par-
ticipate can be parlayed into the power to insist upon unjust enrichment. 25
Compulsion is needed to prevent such holdouts. While "compulsion"
sounds like a bold exercise of sovereign authority, such compulsion is
not ordered until a specified percentage of parties to be affected by the
unitization have consented thereto. This consent requirement generally
involves a majority interest, and thus compulsory fieldwide unitization
is not as authoritarian as its name would imply.26
Although most of these statutes have been in effect for several years,
their use has resulted in very little litigation. This lack of litigation has
been attributed to several factors. The statutes may all have benefitted
from unusually complete draftsmanship. Alternatively, the benefits of
the statutes may be so attractive that interested parties have little reason
to object. Although these views and others may have merit, the credit
for the lack of litigation may lie more correctly with the oil industry's
statesmanlike practices. 27 For whatever reason, there is a lack of litigation
22. 19 Cal. App. 2d 299, 206 P.2d 944 (4th Cir. 1949); Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 434
(1954).
23. Accord, Hunter v. Hussey, 90 So. 2d 429, 6 Oil & Gas Rep. 1172 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1956). But see Daggett, Discussion Notes, 6 Oil & Gas Rep. 1185 (1957).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 141-66.
25. Reed v. Texas, Co., 22 Ill. App. 2d 131, 159 N.E.2d 641, I1 Oil & Gas Rep.
789 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 1959).
26. R. Meyers, supra note 4, § 8.01; an exception is La. R.S. 30:5(B) (1969).
27. Eckman, Statutory Fieldwide Oil and Gas Units: A Review For Future Agreements,
6 Nat. Resources Law. 339, 352-53 (1973); McAnelly, supra note 14, at 4.
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on the subject and the caselaw thus offers little guidance in interpreting
the statutes.
All compulsory fieldwide unitization statutes include a set of pre-
requisites that the administrative agency or regulatory body must find
before a compulsory unit can be ordered. The following requirements
from various states are typical, although not all are required under all
statutes.
21
1. The administrative agency must find that unit operations are
reasonably necessary for one or more of the purposes for which uni-
tization may be ordered. 29 In this regard, Mississippi's statute requires
a finding that:
Unit operation of the field or of any pool or pools, or of any
portion or portions or combinations thereof within the field, is
reasonably necessary in order to effectively carry on secondary
recovery, pressure maintenance, repressuring operations, cycling
operations, water flooding operations, or any combination thereof,
or any other form of joint effort calculated to substantially
increase the ultimate recovery of oil or gas or both .... 30
2. There must be a feasible method of unit operation. The Mis-
sissippi statute requires that "[olne or more method of unitized operation
as applied to such common source of supply or portion thereof is
feasible . 31
3. The cost of unitization must be exceeded by the value of the
extra production to be obtained.3 2 Wyoming's statute clearly states this
in a requirement that the "value of the estimated additional recovery
of oil or gas will exceed the estimated additional costs incident to
conducting unit operations.""
4. There must be a unitization plan or contract. Louisiana's statute
requires "a written contract or contracts covering the terms and operation
of the unitization signed and executed ... and filed with the commis-
s i o n e r . ..., , 4
28. Granville Dutton has summarized the main provisions of all states' unitization
statutes in a table format in his article; Dutton, supra note I1, at 44-45. See also Eckman,
supra note 27, at 384-85.
29. 6 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 1, § 913.4.
30. Miss. Code Ann. § 53-3-103(a) (Supp. 1985).
31. Miss. Code Ann. § 53-3-103(b) (Supp. 1985); 6 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra
note 1, § 913.4.
32. 6 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note I, § 913.4; McAnelly, supra note 14,
at 10.
33. Wyo. Stat. § 30-5-110(e)(iii) (1981).
34. La. R.S. 30:5(C) (1969).
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5. There must be a finding that the proposed operation will be
fair and equitable," as illustrated by Wyoming's statute: "The oil and
gas allocated to each separately owned tract within the unit area under
the proposed plan of unitization represents, so far as can be practically
determined, each such tract's just and equitable share of the oil or gas
in the unit area." 36
6. The correlative rights of the affected interests must be pro-
tected.37 Protection of a party's correlative rights means that the party
must be given a fair opportunity to participate in the operation and
that such participation will ensure that party a fair share of minerals
from the reservoir. 38
7. There may be a "drilled out" requirement. Mississippi's statute
requires:
The operators of such unit shall have drilled a sufficient number
of wells to a sufficient depth and at such locations as may be
necessary for the board to approve the boundaries of the unit
and determine that the field, pool or pools have been reasonably
developed according to a spacing pattern approved by the board. 39
8. A certain percentage of the working interest ownership and the
royalty interest ownership in a field must have voluntarily agreed to the
unitization plan.40 This percentage is generally between sixty and eighty
percent and if the administrative agency finds that the requisite per-
centage has voluntarily consented the agency may "force" unitize the
remaining interests. 41 The Wyoming statute offers a typical example of
this requirement:
No order of the Commission authorizing the commencement of
unit operations shall become effective until the plan of uniti-
zation has been signed or in writing ratified or approved by
those persons who own at least eighty percent (80%) of the unit
production or proceeds thereof that will be credited to royalty
and overriding royalty interests which are free of costs, and
unless both the plan of unitization and the operating plan, if
35. Winfiele, New Legislation Relating to the Conservation Department, 8 Inst. on
Min. L. 9, 14 (1961); 6 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 1, § 913.4.
36. Wyo. Stat. § 30-5-110(e)(iv) (1981).
37. Miss. Code Ann. § 53-3-103(d) (Supp. 1985).
38. Note, Secondary Recovery Operations and The Rule of Capture, 1976 Wash.
U.L.Q. 148, 153 n.18; Comment, Secondary Recovery Operations - Protection of Cor-
relative Rights, 2 Land & Water L. Rev. 129, 150 (1967).
39. Miss. Code Ann. § 53-3-103 (Supp.1985).
40. Anderson, David v. Goliath; Negotiating the "Lessor's 88" and Representing
Lessors and Surface Owners in Oil and Gas Lease Plays, 27 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst.
1029, 1213 (1981).
41. Id. at 1213.
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any, have been signed, or in writing approved or ratified, by
those persons who will be required to pay at least eighty percent
(80%) of the cost of unit operations. 42
This consent requirement is the topic of this paper. The separate elements
of the requirement will be analyzed with an eye towards identifying
problem areas, both for purposes of preventing said problems and
perhaps capitalizing on them.
Why Is Consent Needed?
Although most compulsory fieldwide unitization statutes include a
provision requiring the consent of a certain percentage of the affected
parties, such a requirement does not seem necessary for the statute's
validity. This issue was addressed in the Oklahoma case, Palmer Oil
Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. 43 Under the Oklahoma compulsory
fieldwide unitization statute in effect at that time,"4 consent of only fifty
percent of the lessees was required. The royalty owners were not required
or entitled to consent. Additionally, fifteen percent of the lessees could
veto the operation. The royalty owners challenged this statute on two
grounds. They first alleged that the consent requirement constituted an
unauthorized delegation of legislative power because the effect of the
legislation was made dependent upon the will of the parties affected by
that legislation. The court rejected this challenge because only the Cor-
poration Commission has the authority to create a unit. The consent
requirement was not a legislatively sanctioned exercise of power to create
a unit; it was merely a condition imposed by the legislature upon the
Corporation Commission. 45 This result ensured the validity of statutes
with consent requirements.
The royalty owners also challenged the consent requirement on the
grounds that they were not given the right to consent under the statute.
The royalty owners claimed that this deprived them of the same powers
of petition and protest that were granted to the lessees. The court
dismissed this argument by stating that no consent was required to make
the statute valid:
The question is not the wisdom of granting the right of protest
to the lessees while withholding it from the royalty owners but
whether it was within the power of the Legislature so to do. It
42. Wyo. Stat. § 30-5-110(f) (1981).
43. 204 Okla. 543, 231 P.2d 997 (1951), dismissed sub nom., Palmer Oil Corp. v.
Amerada Petroleum Corp., 343 U.S. 390, 72 S. Ct. 842 (1952) [hereinafter cited as
Palmer].
44. Oklahoma. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, §§ 286.1 - 286.17 (O.S. Supp. 1945).
45. Palmer, 204 Okla. at 548, 231 P.2d at 1003-04.
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was within the power of the Legislature to do so because being
within its police power to enact the law without the consent of
either lessees or royalty owners it was optional with it to require
the consent of either. Where privilege is granted to some in
such situation the Constitution is satisfied if all similarly situated
are treated alike.4
Thus the legislature had acted within its powers in providing for the
consent provision. The court held that granting consent rights to the
lessees only was not an arbitrary discrimination because the lessees
possessed the expertise to determine if unitization was desirable. Indeed,
the lessors had leased their right to drill and produce to the lessees in
reliance upon this expertise. 7
This result was unchanged when this case was appealed to the United
States Supreme Court under the name Palmer Oil Corp. v. Amerada
Petroleum Corp.48 It was there dismissed for lack of a federal question.
Although it had been judicially confirmed that consent was not needed
for compulsory fieldwide unitization statutes to be valid, 49 Oklahoma
amended its law in 1951 to eliminate the fifteen percent veto provision
and instituted a requirement that sixty-three percent of royalty owners
and sixty-three percent of lessees must consent.5 0
Besides being a statutory requirement, consent may be required under
the terms of individual oil and gas leases. Standard leases do not grant
the lessee the authority to enter into operations of the magnitude of
fieldwide unitization." Thus consent must be obtained from the royalty
interest owner to satisfy the lease terms. This was recognized in Ramsey
v. Carter Oil Co. 5 2 The operator in that case planned to institute sec-
ondary recovery operations without the lessor's consent. The court en-
joined the lessee from converting a producing well into an input well
46. Id. at 549, 231 P.2d at 1004.
47. Id. at 550, 231 P.2d at 1005.
48. 343 U.S. 390, 72 S. Ct. 842 (1952).
49. Accordingly, some statutes do not include a consent requirement. For example,
La. R.S. 30:5(B) (1975).
50. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit 52, § 287.5 (1951); IA W. Summers, The Law of Oil and
Gas § 104 n.22.27 (1954).
51. Barfield, supra note 6, at 47; Clark, supra note 8, at 125. An exception is
illustrated by Amoco Prod. Co. v. Jacobs, 746 F.2d 1394 (10th Cir. 1984). In this case,
the lessors refused to consent to the inclusion of their lease in the Bravo Dome Carbon
Dioxide Gas Unit. Amoco relied upon the lease pooling or unitization clause (reproduced
in the appendix to the case, 746 F.2d at 1406) and included the lessor's 2,160 acres in
the unit. The unit contained 1,035,000 acres, making it the largest unitization ever at-
tempted. The court held that the lease clause provided sufficient lessor consent to the
unitization.
52. 172 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 958 (1949).
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after a showing was made that such injection would cause oil and gas
to migrate from the lessor's lands."
The consent requirements may be viewed as desirable features of
these statutes. Landowners appreciate the consent requirement because
it gives them an input and allows them to negotiate an agreement as
to their share of future unit production which generally cannot be
changed except with their consent. Lessees may consider the requirement
desirable because it precludes minority interest lessees from blocking
unitization or demanding major concessions as the price of consent.5 4
Consent under the statutes can be expressed by the consenting parties
signing Unitization Agreements or Unit Operating Agreements." Alter-
natively, the signing of lease amendments will generally suffice. 6
Determination of Consent by Area, Production, and Cost
The compulsory fieldwide unitization statute will provide a general
method for calculating consent, both as to who must consent and how
much their consent will be weighted in computing the total percentage
of consent needed. This calculation is usually done under an area,
production, or cost parameter." For example, under a production pa-
rameter, those parties who are entitled to a share of production must
be included in the group of persons from whom consent must be
obtained. The weight that an individual party's vote carries depends
upon how much of a production share he is entitled to receive. While
the statute will generally provide the basic parameter to be used, the
specifics of the application of that parameter are provided for in the
unitization agreement. The parties who are interested in forming the
unit will draw up the unitization agreement. This contract defines the
rights of the parties and the terms of the unit operation. 8 Additionally,
in applying the statute's consent parameter the unitization agreement
can be used to affect who must consent and the weight of each party's
53. Id., but cf., Caster Oil Co. v. Dees, 340 Il1. App. 449, 92 N.E.2d 519 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1950), in which an Illinois state court allowed an operator to convert a well into a
gas input well as a means of secondary recovery without the consent of the lessor. No
lessor consent was needed because the operator had a duty under the implied obligations
of the standard form lease to produce as a prudent, competent and experienced operator
for the best interest of both lessor and lessee.
54. Winfiele, supra note 35, at 17.
55. Doggett, Practical Legal Problems Encountered in the Formation, Operation and
Dissolution of Fieldwide Oil and Gas Units, 16 Okla. L. Rev. I, 23 (1963); McAnelly,
supra note 14, at 12.
56. McAne~ly, supra note 14, at 12. But see Amoco Prod. Co. v. Jacobs, 746 F.2d
1394 (10th Cir. 1984), discussed supra note 51.
57. Eckman, supra note 27, at 359; Dutton, supra note II, at 49.
58. Doggett, supra note 55, at 22.
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consent. This can be demonstrated by way of a simple hypothetical.
Assume that certain parties wish to unitize a 200 acre reservoir in
a state having a seventy-five percent consent requirement. The state's com-
pulsory unitization statute provides that consent is to be calculated on
the basis of surface acreage contributed to the unit. One landowner
owns eighty acres in the proposed unit and refuses to consent, effectively
blocking the 200 acre unit with a non-consenting forty percent interest.
Assuming that the state administrative agency would approve a smaller
unit and that a smaller unit would still be functional, the parties may
desire to alter their unitization agreement. If the unit boundary can be
adjusted to eliminate part of the nonconsenting owner's lands, sufficient
consenting surface acreage owners may exist. For example, if the parties
could redraw the unit boundary so as to eliminate forty acres of the
non-consenting party's land while only reducing the unit to 160 total
acres, the non-consenting landowner would only have a twenty-five
percent voting interest and could no longer unilaterally obstruct the unit.
Such a redrawing of the unit boundary could be used to eliminate a
non-consenting party. The same manipulation is available under the
production or cost methods, but those parameters are more complex so
manipulation can be more subtle. There are many restraints upon abuse
of these parameters, such as the requirement of approval of the unit
by the administrative agency, and the good faith duty owed by the
lessee to unitize for the mutual benefit of both lessor and lessee,59 so
the opportunity for manipulation will generally be limited.
The area, production, and cost parameters each involve several issues
worthy of discussion.
Area Parameter
The parties who need to consent, and the weight that their consent
carries depends upon the amount of surface acreage that they contribute
to the unit area. The Mississippi statute follows this scheme by computing
consent percentages "on the basis of and in proportion to the surface
acreage content of the unit area.'"'6 When this method is utilized, the
unitization agreement has little effect in determining who consents and
how much their consent counts. The only variable that can be adjusted
is the boundary of the entire unit. This is a difficult factor to adjust
because unit boundaries are usually intended to conform to the geological
extent of the underlying reservoir.
The area formula has the benefit of simplicity and allows for a
relatively easy determination of whether the requisite consent has been
59. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Jacobs, 746 F.2d 1394 (10th Cir. 1984).
60. Miss. Code Ann. § 53-3-107 (1973).
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obtained. The main problem with an area formula is that the consent
voting is not weighted on an economic interest basis. Since the voting
is not dependent upon the parties' economic stake in the unit, it may
be possible for a large landowner to have a strong bargaining position
even though his surface acreage may lie over a less productive part of
the reservoir. This potential inequity may be the reason that the area
formula is used in only a minority of the statutes.
6
1
Production Parameter
The parties from whom consent must be obtained and the weight
of their votes is dependent upon the right of each party to receive
production or proceeds from production. The Louisiana statute uses this
parameter in computing both lessee and royalty owner consent.62
The benefit of this parameter is that it allows voting on the basis
of economic shares and thus protects parties' interests. 63 But there are
several attendant costs. The parties' rights to future production must
be ascertained in order to determine their voting interest. This is generally
done by means of a formula containing both geological and engineering
elements. These technical elements, together with the fact that this
formula is negotiable, ensure that the final formula will be complex.
This complexity is demonstrated by the following formula utilized in
Wyoming's Harzog Draw Field:
Parameter Weight
Usable wells 5.00 percent
First Six Months Production 24.25 percent
Peak Rate 2.50 percent
Wellbore Net Feet 7.50 percent
Last Three Months Production 1.50 percent
Last Six Months Production 1.75 percent
Remaining Primary 14.50 percent
Ultimate Primary 12.25 percent
GLO (General Land Office)
Developed Porosity Acre Feet 5.75 percent
GLO Porosity Acre Feet 12.25 percent 64
Negotiation of these complex formulae may allow larger interests
or, parties with expertise in these areas to adjust factors in their favor.
With or without such manipulations, the parties' economic interests under
the formula cannot be expected to be exact due to the imperfect in-
61. Eckman, supra note 27, at 384-385.
62. Id. at 359; La. R.S. 30:5(C) (1964).
63. Dutton, supra note II, at 47.
64. Gilmore v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 642 P.2d 773, 775, 75 Oil & Gas
Rep. 172 (Wyo. 1982).
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formation, such as geological data, used to calculate such interests.
Despite these technical drawbacks, the use of production formulae is a
better representative of economic interests than the area formulae.
Cost Parameter
Under the cost parameter method, consent rights and vote weight
depends upon the share of unit expense that the party will be obligated
to bear under the proposed unitization agreements. 65 These formulae are
only applicable to working interest owner consent provisions, and are
generally combined with provisions providing for computation of royalty
consent under a production parameter.6 Oklahoma and Wyoming both
utilize this method. 67
This parameter is roughly equivalent to the production parameter
in regards to costs and benefits. Beneficially, the parameter protects
economic interests by providing for economically based voting. But
allocation of costs between the parties will generally be determined under
a complex formula like the previously discussed production formula.
This complexity problem is not as much of a concern in this instance
because only lessees are involved and all can be expected to possess
some measure of expertise.
Treatment of Royalties
The treatment of royalty interests causes several potential problems
under the statutes. One such problem involves the weighing of royalty
interest ownership to provide proportionate voting between royalty own-
ers. For example, if two landowners each contribute their 100 acre tracts
to a unit, but one landowner has a standard one-eighth royalty and the
other has a one-fourth royalty, a potential problem exists in allocating
voting rights between these parties. One author has criticized the Wy-
oming statute for failing to deal adequately with this issue. 68 Williams
and Meyers give four possible solutions to this problem. 69
Under the first solution, royalty above the standard one-eighth roy-
alty interest could be deprived of any vote.70 A strict reading of the
Oklahoma statute which requires consent "by owners of record of not
less than sixty three percent (63%) . . .of the normal one-eighth (1/8)
royalty interest""' could produce this result.
65. Eckman, supra note 27, at 359.
66. Id. at 384-85; Dutton, supra note II, at 47.
67. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, § 287.5 (1951); Wyo. Stat. § 30-5-110(f) (1981).
68. Comment, Wyoming's New Unitization Statute, 6 Land & Water L. Rev. 537
(1971).
69. 6 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 1, § 913.5.
70. Id. at § 913.5.
71. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, § 287.5 (1951).
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A second possible solution is to provide for a one-man-one-vote
rule, which would give owners of royalty above or below the standard
one-eighth royalty the same voting rights as the owner of a one-eighth
royalty interest. Williams and Meyers reject this solution because such
a plan would allow the owner of a royalty to subdivide his interest into
as many parts as he needed to defeat or approve the unit.7 2
A third solution was a compromise between the first two. Royalty
over one-eighth would not be entitled to vote except as a normal one-
eighth interest, and royalty below one-eighth would only receive a partial
vote. Williams and Meyers demonstrate this solution with a hypothetical:
A, B, and C each own 1,000 acres of land in fee, the total of
which makes up the entire unit area. A leased for 1/4 royalty;
B for the standard 1/8; and C for the standard 1/8, but C
conveyed 1/2 of his royalty to D. A has one vote; B has one
vote; and C and D each have 1/2 of the vote.
73
This solution raises an additional issue in regards to the fate of A's
unvoted excess one-eighth share. The unvoted interest may be absorbed
into the working interest ownership which would thus be standardized
as a net seven-eighths interest. Whether such a transfer of voting interest
from royalty owner to working interest owner would give rise to a
fiduciary duty upon the working interest owner to vote the transferred
portion of the interest in accordance with the best interests of the royalty
interest owner presents an interesting dilemma. 74
A similar solution is utilized by the Wyoming statute in its treatment
of overriding royalty interests, but as shall be discussed below there are
valid reasons for different treatment of such interests. 75
The fourth and favored solution provided that voting should be
weighted in accordance with economic interest. 76 Under this solution,
the owner of a larger royalty has a greater economic stake in the unit
and should be entitled to a larger vote share. Such a plan could be
instituted by means of a "royalty-acre" formula. A royalty-acre is the
normal one-eighth royalty on one acre. Under such a formula, a one
fourth royalty interest owner of a 100 acre tract would have 200 royalty
acres 77
This voting based on economic interest seems to be what was in-
tended by the Wyoming statute, and the previously mentioned criticism
72. 6 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 1, § 913.5.
73. Id. at § 913.5.
74. Palmer, 204 Okla. at 550-551, 231 P.2d at 1006.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 87-95; Wyo. Stat. § 30-50-110(f) (1981).
76. 6 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 1, § 913.5.
77. Id. at § 913.5.
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is unfounded.78 This intent is ascertained from the wording of the statute,
which bases voting shares on rights to production without any limitation
on the quantum of royalty interests. The statute limits overriding royalty
vote for another purpose, but no such limitation burdens other royalty
interests.719 This economic interest based voting is the fairest method of
allocating voting shares, and it will theoretically prevent the formation
of units which would not economically benefit the participants.
Another problem in the treatment of royalty interests concerns the
voting rights of owners of royalty independent of any lease. Such royalty
is sometimes called royalty per se.80 Most compulsory unitization statutes
do not distinguish this type of royalty, and the problem is in ascertaining
if such interest gets a vote, and if so, with what interests that vote is
categorized.
It is not desirable to have parties who have an interest in the unit
excluded from the consent voting, even though such discrimination may
be allowed.8 ' In order to allow owners of royalty per se to have an
input in the formation of the unit, their interests should be included
with other royalty owners. The wording of the statutes generally refers
to "royalty owners '8 2 or "royalty and overriding royalty interests which
are free of costs," 83 and such descriptions are broad enough to include
royalty per se owners. By creating a voting category for royalty owners,
the statutes are generally drawing a distinction between cost-free and
cost-bearing interests. Under such a distinction the royalty per se owner
is properly included with other cost-free interests who will likely share
similar concerns in regards to the unit plan.
The Oklahoma statute may not include language broad enough to
allow royalty per se to vote with other royalty interests. The statute
requires consent "by lessees of record of not less than sixty three percent
(63%) of the unit area affected thereby and by owners of record of
not less than sixty three percent (63%) (exclusive of royalty interests
owned by lessees or by subsidiaries of any lessee) of the normal one-
eighth (1/8) royalty interest. . . ."4 The "normal" leasehold royalty
of one-eighth will be owned by the lessor. A strict construction of this
statute would result in the royalty per se owner not being entitled to
vote because such interest does not fit into either voting category. The
78. Gray & Swan, Fieldwide Unitization in Wyoming, 7 Land & Water L. Rev. 433,
446 (1972).
79. Id. at 446; Wyo. Stat. § 30-5-110(f) (1981).
80. E.g., La. R.S. 31:80 (1974).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 43-50; Palmer, 204 Okla. 543, 231 P.2d 997
(1951).
82. La. R.S. 30:5(C) (1964).
83. Wyo. Stat. § 30-5-110(f) (1981).
84. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, § 287.5 (1951).
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inclusion of the parenthetical language excluding interests connected with
the lessee indicates that a broader reading may have been intended, but
strong arguments can be made against voting rights for a royalty per
se owner under the statute's language.
Mississippi's statute imposes a similar restriction on royalty interests.
The statute requires consent of eighty-five percent of the royalty owners
"exclusive of royalty interests owned by lessees or by subsidiaries or
successors in title of any lessee.""5 This provision is designed to prevent
royalty owners whose interests are sympathetic to the lessees and working
interest owners from voting in the class of cost-free interest. This pro-
vision deals with a valid concern, but as will be discussed below, there
may be fairer ways to treat such interests rather than depriving them
of any consent voting rights.
8 6
The most troublesome royalty problem concerns treatment of over-
riding royalty interests. Overriding royalties cause problems because
they are difficult to classify into a consent category representing owners
of interests with similar concerns for the unit. Overriding royalties are
generally created by a working interest owner, often as the result of a
sublease in which an original lessee subleases to the working interest
owner while reserving an overriding royalty. This transaction is often
the result of a mutually profitable business arrangement, and the sub-
lessor is likely to be sympathetic to the desires of the working interest
owner. But the interests of the original lessee and the sublessee may
also be considered as divergent. The sublessor now has a cost-free interest
limited to one tract. The sublessee is a cost-bearing party whose interests
may extend to several tracts within the unit. These differences can cause
conflicts between the interests of the parties. For example, the sublessee
may be willing to accept a unitization plan which is unfavorable to the
sublessor's tract but which will benefit' the sublessee elsewhere in the
unit.8 7 Recognition (or non-recognition) of this difficulty in ascertaining
where the overriding royalty interest owner's concerns actually lie has
resulted in different treatment of overriding royalties under different
statutes.
One possible method of treating this royalty is to withhold voting
rights from overriding royalty owners. This could be rationalized on the
ground that the vote should be exercised by the lessee or sublessee who
created the interest. But creating such a representational duty ignores
the divergence of interest between cost-free and cost-bearing parties. 8
85. Miss. Code Ann. § 53-3-107 (1967).
86. See infra text accompanying note 95.
87. State of Louisiana Office of Conservation Order No. 1027-A-8 (effective August
23, 1983).
88. Gray & Swan, supra note 78, at 445.
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A second solution is to put the cost-free overriding royalty interest
into the cost-free royalty interest classification for consent purposes. The
problem with this is that it may allow a lessee to dilute the lessor's
vote. A law review article has stated:
There was a reasonable basis for the concern on this point. For
financing purposes, very large cost-free interests may be carved
out of the working interest on a tract, such as production
payment or overriding royalty. The net result is to produce a
cost-free interest, the owner of which probably will be sympa-
thetic with the lessee or working interest owner. The interest
might well be of sufficient size to outweigh the vote of the
lessor holding the basic 1/8th royalty interest in the tract. Con-
ceivably, such large cost-free interests could be carved out by
designing lessees for the purpose of achieving approval by the
owners of the specified percentage of cost free interests. 9
Classifying the override with the working interest owners for consent
purposes may not adequately protect the interests of the overriding
royalty interest owner. When the interests of the cost-free override are
divergent from the interests of the working interest owners, the relatively
minor interest of the overriding royalty will likely be railroaded by the
much larger working interest ownership. A recent amendment to Lou-
isiana's statute has classified overriding royalty interest owners together
with working interest owners. 90 This amendment was made in response
to an Order issued by the Louisiana Commissioner of Conservation
which focused on the distinction between cost-free and cost-bearing
interests and classified the overriding royalty interest owners in a consent
category with other "royalty owners." 9' The Order of the Commissioner
conformed to the wording of the statute before its amendment, but it
is submitted that neither the old nor the new versions of the statute
sufficiently and fairly deal with this issue. 92
More desirable methods of handling overriding royalty interests in-
volve placing limitations on the voting rights of the interest so that the
interest cannot be manipulated to unfairly affect consent. The Mississippi
statute places the overriding royalty vote in with the "royalty owners,"
but the vote is "exclusive of royalty interests owned by lessees or by
subsidiaries or successors in title of any lessee." 93 Whether a sublessor
is a "successor" in title may turn on whether the sublease "reserved"
89. Id. at 445.
90. La. R.S. 30:5(C) (1964).
91. State of Louisiana Office of Conservation Order No. 1027-A-8 (effective August
23, 1983).
92. See infra text accompanying notes 93-95.
93. Miss. Code Ann. § 53-3-107 (1964).
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or "granted" an override to the sublessor. If the override is reserved,
the sublessor can vote with the cost-free royalty interest owners. This
allows the overriding royalty interest owner to vote with presumably
conforming interests, and also prevents dilution of royalty owner consent
by a sublessee. The only remaining concern is whether the sublessor is
so sympathetic with the sublessee that he will blindly vote in accordance
with that interest.
A similar limitation is implemented by the Wyoming statute. The
statute provides that "to the extent that overriding royalty interests are
in excess of a total of twelve and one-half percent (12 1/2%) of the
production from any tract, such excess interests shall not be considered
in determining the percentage of approval or ratification by such cost-
free interests. '94 This provision provides that overriding royalty interests
vote with cost-free royalty owners and it prevents dilution of the
cost-free voting by the sublessee by putting a twelve and one-half percent
limit on the quantum of overriding royalty vote. The problem with this
provision is that it ignores the possibility of multiple successive subleases
which create several overriding royalties in several parties. These over-
riding royalty interest owners would apparently vote by dividing the
maximum twelve and one-half percent voting interest among themselves.
Thus they are deprived of a voting interest in proportion to their
economic interest on the basis of the assumption that they would vote
sympathetically with the sublessee in all cases. Although this assumption
may not always be accurate, especially when one sublessor in a chain
of subleases is not in privity with the ultimate sublessee, the statute is
a fair compromise. The overriding royalty interest owners get some
voting rights, and dilution of cost-free voting by the sublessee is pre-
vented.
The limitations imposed by the Mississippi and Wyoming statutes
seem to be fair compromise treatment of overriding royalty interests.
An even fairer approach may be the creation of a third category of
consent interests comprised solely of owners of overriding royalty in-
terests.9" This category may be justified due to the considerable diffi-
culties faced in fitting such an interest into preexisting royalty or working
interest categories. But generally, overriding royalties represent a rela-
tively minor economic interest in a given unit, and thus may not warrant
separate treatment of this sort. If a third category is created, it may
be desirable to have a lower consent percentage requirement in order
to prevent these relatively minor interests from unfairly blocking an
entire unit program.
94. Wyo. Stat. § 30-5-110 (f) (1981).
95. Gray & Swan, supra note 78, at 445.
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Title Disputes, Unleased Lands, Encumbrances, and Large
Landowners
When there is dispute over title to a tract included in a unit, an
issue arises in regards to consent voting for that tract. The administrative
agency does not have authority to adjudicate title disputes, so it cannot
proclaim one party the "owner" and accept his vote. 96 Three alternative
treatments are worthy of discussion.
First, the disputed acreage could be excluded from consent consid-
eration. While a consent provision is not required to make a statute
constitutional, 97 the granting of voting rights to some landowners while
depriving other landowners of similar voting rights because their title is
in dispute may violate Equal Protection rights. Although such a clas-
sification may not be arbitrary or capricious and thus possibly consti-
tutional, 9 this solution seems inherently weak.
A second solution may be for the administrative agency to determine
who is likely to prevail in the title dispute and then accept that party's
vote. The obvious problem with this solution is that the agency deter-
mination may be wrong. There may be serious problems if the unit is
approved and instituted on the basis of this incorrect voting and the
true owners later object to the unit. Unless such a determination can
be made with a high degree of certainty, it is doubtful that an admin-
istrative agency would approve a unit with such a risk factor.
The only reasonable solution seems to be to require that the effects
of the dispute be neutralized. The parties proposing the unit should set
this as their goal regardless of how they expect the administrative agency
to deal with the problem. Neutralizing the interest can be accomplished
in two ways. First, the requisite consent can hopefully be obtained
without any need for the disputed tract's vote. If the consent of the
disputed tract is necessary in order to obtain the requisite consent
percentage, the parties proposing the unit may wish to obtain consent
from all parties contesting the title. In this way, the consent will exist
regardless of the judicial outcome of the dispute. These cautious ap-
proaches are warranted from the standpoint of both the administrative
agency and the parties petitioning for the unit formation in order to
avoid needless expenditure on a unit proposal which may ultimately fail
due to title disputes.
The voting rights of unleased lands included within the proposed
unit area are generally covered by the statutes. Theoretically, these
96. State of Louisiana Office of Conservation Order No. 1027-A-8 (effective August
23, 1983).
97. Id.
98. See Palmer, 204 Okla. at 549-50, 231 P.2d at 1004-05 (discussing the equal
protection issue in the context of the consent requirement), as discussed in text accom-
panying supra notes 45-47.
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landowners, by not having leased their lands, have retained both a
working interest and a royalty interest and thus should be entitled to
vote in both categories of consent. But the compulsory unitization stat-
utes generally create voting categories on the basis of a distinction
between cost-free and cost-bearing interests. A consenting unleased land-
owner would bear his share of costs, and to allow him to vote in the
cost-free interests with the royalty owners will dilute the voting rights
of the cost-free interests.9 Most statutes recognize this problem and
expressly provide for unleased land voting. For example, Louisiana's
statute provides for voting in a category of "owners.""00 "Owners" are
elsewhere defined to include "the person who has the right to drill into
and to produce from a pool and to appropriate the production either
for himself or for others,"' 01 and an unleased landowner clearly retains
that right. Similarly, Oklahoma's statutory voting category of "lessees"' 0 2
is defined to include "owners of unleased lands or mineral rights having
the right to develop the same for oil and gas."' 03 This limitation on
the voting rights of unleased landowners can be easily defeated by means
of a lease to an affiliate."° 4
Another concern regards voting of encumbered lands. Generally the
record owner is entitled to vote for or against the unit plan. 05 Wyoming
has a fair treatment of such interests because the owners of encumbrances
are given notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to appear and
assert any rights that they may claim.1°6 The decision as to which party
should be given the right to vote "should be determined on the basis
of who, under general property and contract law, holds the incidents
of ownership of the interest involved."' '
A different problem may exist where one person may own a large
enough percentage of working interest or royalty interest to satisfy the
statutory consent requirement by himself."'° "Some statutes deal directly
with the problem and require that at least one other working or royalty
interest owner agree to unitization; it is conceivable that such a provision
99. State of Louisiana Office of Conservation Order No. 1027-A-8 (effective August
23, 1983).
100. La. R.S. 30:5(C) (1964).
101. La. R.S. 30:3(8) (1964).
102. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, § 287.5 (1951).
103. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, § 287.13(a) (1951).
104. State of Louisiana Office of Conservation Order No. 1027-A-8 (effective August
23, 1983).
105. 6 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 1, § 913.5.
106. Gray & Swan, supra note 78, at 446.
107. Id.
108. Custy & Knowlton, Compulsory Field-Wide Unitization Comes to Mississippi, 36
Miss. L.J. 123. 127 (1965); 6 Williams & C. Meyers, supra note I, § 913.5.
19861
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
might be written into a statute which lacked it if a court was presented
with a difficult problem."'0 9
Timeliness of Consent
There are two possible deadlines for obtaining the percentage of
consent required by the statutes; contractual and statutory. The con-
tractual deadline is imposed by the parties themselves in the unitization
agreement. This deadline is the date on which the unitization agreement
will expire if the requisite consent has not been obtained." 0 There is
no requirement that the parties proposing the operation continue their
offer of participation for an indefinite period of time"' and thus these
deadlines may be earlier than statutory deadlines.
Statutory deadlines are divided into two basic groups."' Some stat-
utes require that the requisite consent be obtained before the adminis-
trative agency hearing. Louisiana follows this scheme,"' which allows
the administrative agency to approve or disapprove the unit plan solely
on the basis of information presented at the original hearing.
The second basic statutory deadline scheme requires that consent be
obtained within a specified time after the administrative agency hearing,
generally within six or twelve months.' '4 Under this scheme, the agency
may then schedule "supplemental" hearings for the purpose of ascer-.
taning if the requisite consent has been obtained. Both Oklahoma and
Wyoming utilize this method, and both provide that the unit order shall
be revoked by the administrative agency if the requisite consent is not
obtained within six months of the date of the order approving the
unit.' The Wyoming statute allows further extensions upon a showing
of "good cause,""16 but the Oklahoma deadline-is absolute." 7 Although
the administrative agency has approved the unit plan prior to obtaining
the requisite consent, the order to unitize is not effective until the plan
is ratified by the necessary consent." 8 This system may make it easier
for the parties proposing the unit to obtain the needed consent. The
administrative agency generally must find that the unit order is "fair"
109. Custy & Knowlton, supra note 108, at 127.
110. Barfield, supra note 6, at 51.
Ill. Note, Oil and Gas Production From a Unitized Area - The Nonjoining Owner,
20 SW. L.J. 907, 912 (1966).
112. Eckman, supra note 27, at 384-85 nn.2 & 10; Dutton, supra note 11, at'44.
113. La. R.S. 30:5(C) (1964); McAnelly, supra note 14, at 12.
114. Eckman, supra note 27, at 384-85 nn.2, 18 & 27; Dutton, supra note Ii, at 44.
115. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, § 287.5 (191); Wyo. Stat. § 30-5-110(0 1981).
116. Wyo. Stat. § 30-5-110(f) (1981).
117. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, § 287.5 (1951).
118. Price v. Corporation Comm'n, 382 P.2d 425 (Okla. 1963); Eason Oil Co. v.
Corporation Comm'n, 535 P.2d 283 (Okla. 1975).
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in order to grant approval,119 and this finding may be a considerable
selling point in obtaining consent. Also, the approved unit may act as
an effective block to alternative proposals. Conversely, a deadline for
consent after obtaining administrative approval may not be an efficient
use of government resources. If the requisite consent is not obtained,
costly hearings and supplemental hearings have been held for no reason.
Although the costs of such hearings may be substantially borne by the
parties proposing the unit, there are other costs such as the inefficient
use of administrative time. This concern is apparently not very persuasive
to legislatures as a majority of the statutes have adopted a supplemental
deadline system similar to that used under the Oklahoma and Wyoming
statutes. 120
Administrative Approval
Besides requiring the consent of a certain percentage of unit par-
ticipants, compulsory unitization statutes require approval of the unit
by the state administrative agency. All these statutes require this ap-
proval, as only the exercise of state police power can order compulsory
unitization. As previously discussed, the approval is contingent upon a
finding by the administrative agency of several prerequisites. 12 1
The authority of an administrative agency under these statutes has
been criticized as "unduly restricted."' 22 The Louisiana statute has par-
ticularly been criticized because the Commissioner of Conservation's
authority is limited to either approval of the project as previously
approved by the majority of the interested owners or outright rejection
of the application. The Commissioner is not empowered to force any
compromise. 23 Discretion under most statutes appears to be similarly
restricted.
The State Oil and Gas Board of Alabama recently construed its
powers in a broader fashion, despite a lack of specific statutory au-
thorization. Getty Oil Company petitioned to unitize the Smackover-
Norphlet Gas Pool in the Hatter's Pond Field in Mobile County, Al-
abama. One of the main features of the unitization was a participation
formula based 100 percent on pore volume. 24 This formula and other
elements of the unit plan were challenged at the hearing, and the resultant
order issued by the State Oil and Gas Board did not approve the unit.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
120. Eckman, supra note 27, at 384-85; see Dutton, supra note 11, at 44 & 47.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 29-42.
122. Winfiele, supra note 35, at 17.
123. McAnelly, supra note 14, at 9.
124. Pore volume is the storage space in rock expressed in porosity feet, as calculated
by multiplying the net pay feet by the average porosity for each foot of pay.
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The Board also went one step further and "remanded" the petition to
Getty. The Board "ordered" that Getty "immediately prepare a uniti-
zation proposal, including a Unit Agreement, a Unit Operating Agree-
ment, and Special Field Rules" consistent with the Board's findings,
which in effect instituted a compromise between Getty and the opponent
parties. '
The administrative agency's consent and the satisfaction of all sta-
tutory prerequisites results in the compelled unitization of the noncon-
senting interests. "The order issued ... adopting the unit agreement
and requiring its operation as to nonsigners has the effect of approving,
insofar as nonsigners are concerned, the essential elements of the unit
agreement, such as method of physical operation, areal extent of the
unit, and tract participations in unit production. 1 1 26 It is uncertain
whether other terms and conditions of the unitization agreement, such
as force majeure and surface usage rights, are also imposed on non-
consenting parties. 27 The main constraint in this area' is the Contract
Clause of the United States Constitution which provides that no state
shall pass a law impairing the obligations of contracts. '28 Enforcing all
of the terms of the unitization agreement against the non-consenting
parties may violate this constitutional provision if such terms vary sub-
stantially from individual lease terms.
Amendment
Consent requirements are also an issue when an amendment of an
existing unit is sought. Most compulsory unitization statutes contain
provisions allowing amendments on basically the same terms as are
required for unit formation.12 9 For example, the basic amendment pro-
vision of the Wyoming statute states, "[an order entered by the com-
mission under this act (section) may be amended in the same manner
and subject to the same conditions as an original order ... ,"130 Onerous
amendatory provisions are desirable from the landowner's point of view
because they allow the landowner to rely upon the original unit contract
as a firm definition of his economic rights.'
3
'
The Louisiana statute has no provision for amendment of the unit,
and thus amendment may involve the creation of a completely new unit
125. State Oil -and Gas Board of Alabama Order No. 83-70, dated July 29, 1983.
126. Id. at 13.
127. Id.; Parkin v. State Corp. Comm'n, 677 P.2d 991, 1002, 80 Oil & Gas Rep. 39,
59 (Kans. 1984) ("[B]y no stretch of the imagination can the unwilling interest holders
be considered parties to a unitization 'contract').
128. U.S. Const. art. I., sec. 10.
129. Eckman, supra note 27, at 361.
130. Wyo. Stat. § 30-5-110(h) (1981).
131. McAnelly, supra note 14, at 16.
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incorporating the desired changes.' 32 The same consent requirements
would be applicable to both the original unit and the amendment. While
the Louisiana law is currently unclear regarding amendment, one possible
way to avoid a requirement that amendments be made by creating a
completely new unit would be to include amendatory process in the
Unitization Agreement. The Commissioner's approval of the unit would
thus approve the amendatory procedure. Such a method has adminis-
trative merit, but may constitute an unlawful delegation of the Com-
missioner's power."'
Amendments are generally allowed for the purposes of changing the
unit operating agreement or enlarging the unit area. When the amend-
ment is limited to working interest matters, such as an allocation of
equipment investments, the majority of the statutes only require the
consent of the working interest owners.'14 For example, the Oklahoma
statute provides that "where an amendment to plan of unitization relates
only to the rights and obligations as between lessees the requirement
that the same be signed, ratified or approved by royalty owners of
record of not less than sixty three per cent [sic] (630o) of the unit area
shall have no application.""' This is a desirable provision which makes
it relatively easy for cost-bearing interests to adjust their burdens, while
at the same time protecting minority interests and royalty owners.
Enlargement of the unit area generally requires the consent of both
current unit participants and those parties to be added to the unit,
under the same percentage requirements as were applicable to approval
of the original unit. 3 6 Most statutes also provide that such an amendment
cannot alter allocations of production between tracts within the prior
132. La. R.S. 30:5(C) (1964).
133. The Kansas Supreme Court held that such a procedure was invalid in Parkin v.
State Corp. Comm'n, 234 Kan. 994, 677 P.2d 991, 80 Oil & Gas Rep. 39 (Kans. 1984).
In this case, the original plan of unitization, as approved by order of the Kansas
Corporation Commission, included a provision whereby 65 percent of the working interest
owners could terminate the unit when they determined that unitized substances could no
longer be produced in paying quantities and that the unit was infeasible. The Corporation
Commission had denied the plaintiff/royalty owner's petition for unit termination on the
grounds that the sole working interest owner (Misco Industries) still believed that unit
operations were feasible. The court held that only the Corporation Commission had the
authority to decide when unitization should terminate, and that such authority could not
be delegated to the working interest owners. Similarly, The State Oil and Gas Board of
Alabama recently refused to endorse a Unit Agreement provision which would have allowed
enlargement of the unit area and unitized formation upon written consent by 60 percent
of the royalty owners in the unit area prior to enlargement. State Oil and Gas Board of
Alabama Order No. 83-170, dated July 29, 1983. This amendment procedure would have
been in contravention of a specific statutory procedure: Ala. Code § 9-17-85 (1975).
134. Eckman, supra note 27, at 361.
135. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, § 287.10 (1951).
136. Eckman, supra note 27, at 361; Miss. Code Ann. § 53-3-109(b) (1964).
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unit, except perhaps with the consent of the owner of every affected
tract. 3 7 For example, the Wyoming statute states that "no amendatory
order shall change the percentage for the allocation of oil and gas as
established by the original order for any separately owned tract, except
with the written consent of all persons owning oil and gas rights in
such tracts. . . .,"1a Under unitization statutes such as Louisiana's where
a completely new unit plan may be needed to amend the unit, tract
allocation can apparently be changed by the same percentage of consent
as required to form the original unit.'3 9 Under either amendatory pro-
cedure, unit participants are assured that their economic rights under
the original unit plan are being protected.'"
Problems in Obtaining Consent
As previously discussed, an administrative agency can order a com-
pulsory fieldwide unit only after a requisite percentage of the parties
to the unit have consented to the unit plan. 4" One reason justifying the
state's ability to compel the unitization is the difficulty in forming a
voluntary fieldwide unit by obtaining consent of 100 percent of the
parties involved. 42 The result is that most statutes require only between
sixty and eighty percent of the parties under the unit plan to consent
before the state can compel formation of the unit."" While the statutes
thus reduce the quantum of consent required, they have not eliminated
the problems involved in obtaining consent. While it certainly is easier
to obtain consent of between sixty and eighty percent of the parties
involved than it is to obtain 100 percent consent, there are still many
difficulties involved in obtaining consent.
Many state statutes exacerbate these difficulties by requiring a high
percent of the parties under the unit plan to consent to its formation.
Mississippi's eighty-five percent requirement is the highest in the country,'"4
and it has been criticized as "unrealistic" as compared to the lower
requirements in other states.1 41 The Mississippi compulsory fieldwide
unitization statute has been singularly unsuccessful, as evidenced by the
fact that it was utilized only once between 1964 and 1972.'" Recent
137. Eckman, supra note 27, at 361, 384-85; 6 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note
1, § 913.10.
138. Wyo. Stat. § 30-5-110(h)(ii) (1981).
139. La. R.S. 30:5(C) (1964).
140. McAnelly, supra note 14, at 16.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
143. Anderson, supra note 40, at 1213.
144. Eckman, supra note 27, at 385; Miss. Code Ann. § 53-3-105 (1972).
145. Rogers & Gault, supra note 12, at 196; see Dutton, supra note !1, at 47.
146. Id. at 187.
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amendments have eliminated many of the other weak points of the
statute, but the eighty-five percent consent requirement has remained.
147
Another state with a relatively high consent requirement is Wyoming
which requires consent of eighty percent of both cost-free and cost-
bearing interests. 14 However, the Wyoming statute has an unusual pro-
vision allowing a reduction of the consent requirement to seventy-five
percent. This reduction can be ordered upon a finding that negotiations
have been conducted diligently and in good faith for at least nine months
before the filing of the application, and that the eighty percent approval
will not be obtained. 49 It is submitted that such a provision effectively
lowers the Wyoming requirement to seventy-five percent and that the
statute should simply state this rather than requiring the further uniti-
zation expense involved in applying for a reduction of the eighty percent
requirement. Higher consent requirements may hinder unitization proj-
ects, thus effectively defeating the conservation purposes of the statutes.
One of the difficulties faced in obtaining consent involves the logistic
problems of identifying the parties who need to consent and then phys-
ically obtaining that consent. 50 An example of the magnitude of this
difficulty is presented by the Hawkins Field Unit in East Texas. The
field was comprised of 327 tracts, covering 10,665 acres. Through sales,
inheritances, conveyances and severances the title included over 3,000
royalty owners. 5 ' An effort to obtain consent to unitize a comparable
field may literally take years to complete.'5 2 Difficulties in both iden-
tifying the necessary' parties and obtaining their consent are beyond the
scope of this paper, but the Hawkins Field provides a vivid example
of the possible logistic problems involved.'
The element of risk can make it difficult to obtain consent in two
ways. First, parties may decline to consent to what they perceive to be
a risky operation.5 4 These parties may be receiving a steady production
income and may not want to risk losing such monies in the event that
the unitization project backfires. The second aspect of risk involves what
147. Id. at 196-197.
148. Wyo. Stat. § 30-5-110(f) (1981).
149. Id.; Gilmore v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 642 P.2d 773, 75 Oil & Gas
Rep. 172 (Wyo. 1982).
150. See generally Prutzman, Cage, Fletcher, Keith. Miller & Winn, supra note 12;
Meyers, supra note 5, at 107.
151. Barfield, supra note 6, at 47; Putzman, Cage, Fletcher, Keith, Miller & Winn,
supra note 12 (the McComb Field Unit in Pike County, Mississippi contained over 2100
royalty owners).
152. McAnelly, supra note 14, at 18.
153. See Barfield, supra note 6, at 41 (discusses practicalities involved in obtaining
consent).
154. 6 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note I, § 913.5.
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Williams and Meyers refer to as the "Gambler's instincts."'" Some
lessees may believe that their interests lie in the most favorable part of
the producing structure and they are willing to risk that the production
solely from their land will be more valuable than an undivided interest
in the fieldwide unit.
The most frequently disputed issue in unitization and the most serious
obstacle to obtaining the requisite consent is determining the method of
production allocation."16 Early statutes and cases often allocated pro-
duction on the basis of and in proportion to surface acreage contribution
to the unit.' 7 These allocation formulae had the benefit of simplicity
and certainty, but were only fair in the rare instances where formations
were uniform in quality and thickness throughout the unit so that each
tract had equal reserves per acre." 8 Although such formulae have been
judicially upheld,5 9 production in a fieldwide unit is rarely, if ever,
solely allocated on a surface acreage basis under the modern statutes.
Modern statutes generally require in broad terms that the allocation
of production be equitable, leaving the specifics of allocating production
to the parties proposing the unit. An example of this type statutory
requirement, and an excellent example of excessive legalese, is presented
by the Mississippi statute:
A formula for the allocation among the separately owned tracts
in the unit area of all the oil or gas, or both, produced and
saved from the unit area, and not required in the conduct of
such operation, which formula must expressly be found reason-
ably to permit persons otherwise entitled to share in or benefit
by the production from such separately owned tracts to receive,
in lieu thereof, their fair, equitable and reasonable share of the
unit production or other benefits thereof. A separately owned
tract's fair, equitable and reasonable share of the unit production
shall be that proportionate part of unit production that the
contributing value of such tract for oil and gas purposes in the
unit area and its contributing value to the unit bears to the
total of all like values of all tracts in the unit, taking into
account all pertinent engineering, geological and operating fac-
tors that are reasonably susceptible of determination.160
155. Id. at § 910.
156. Eckman, supra note 27, at 359; Barfield, supra note 6, at 45; 6 H. Williams &
C. Meyers, supra note 1, § 910.
157. Custy & Knowlton, supra note 108, at 129; Corley v. Mississippi State Oil &
Gas Bd., 234 Miss. 199, 213, 105 So. 2d 633, 639 (1958).
158. Corley v. Mississippi State Oil & Gas Bd., 234 Miss. 199, 213, 105 So. 2d 633,
639 (1958).
159. Id.; Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Welborn, 216 Miss. 180, 62 So. 2d 211 (1953).
160. Miss. Code Ann. § 53-3-105(c) (1972).
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The parties proposing the unit will create an algebraic formula
combining a variety of parameters to allocate production. 61 An example
of the struggle to create an equitable formula is illustrated by Gilmore
v. Oil and Gas Conservation Commission.' 62 In this case, eighty-one
working interest owners negotiated and considered seventy-one separate
formulae for production allocation. The formulae became increasingly
complex as individual parties urged the inclusion of specific geological
or engineering parameters favorable to their tracts. After unsuccessfully
voting on almost sixty formulae including various parameters, the parties
reexamined their voting records and used a computer to create a com-
promise formula.'6 3 This formula only received 75.89 percent approval,
which met Wyoming's statutory consent requirement after the Com-
missioners reduced the requirement. 16' Problems like these are common,
as the allocation of production is subject to legitimate expert contro-
versy. 165
Other difficulties in obtaining consent have been identified as in-
cluding the pride of ownership, structural advantage of particular prop-
erties, profitable obstructionism, lack of reservoir data, lease prohibitions,
and federal controls on the price of oil and gas.'6 Although compulsory
fieldwide unitization statutes make it easier to obtain consent by not
requiring 100 percent approval, the realities of obtaining consent still
represent a formidable obstacle to fieldwide unitization.
Conclusion
The consent requirements in fieldwide unitization statutes contain
many issues ripe for dispute. Undoubtedly many unit plans could be
defeated by challenges to the application of these statutory consent
requirements. It seems that only the cooperative nature of the oil industry
and the recognition of the benefits to be gained by fieldwide unitization
have prevented significant litigation under these statutes. Should such
litigation ever arise, the statutory consent requirements may prove in-
adequate to withstand the challenges, and revised legislation may be
necessary.
John C. LaMaster
161. Barfield, supra note 6, at 44.
162. 642 P.2d 773, 75 Oil & Gas Rep. 172 (Wyo. 1982); see also Prutzman, Cage,
Fletcher, Keith, Miller & Winn, supra note 12, at 105-06
163. Gilmore v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 642 P.2d 773, 75 Oil & Gas Rep.
172. (Wyo. 1982) (this formula is reprinted in text accompanying supra note 64).
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165. Eckman, supra note 24, at 359.
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